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GROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL CHANGE:
THE ROLE OF HISTORY AND ORIGINS
This paper is part of a series of studies having to do with
the interaction of group identity and political change. It will
deal particularly with the role of history and origins in the
group identity patterns of members of several different groups
of people with whom and about whom I have been exploring these
matters in recent years. These groups are educated ex-Untouchables
in India, Negroes in the United States, American Jewish immigrants
in Israel, Chinese in Malaya, post-colonial Filipinos, and
post-imperial Japanese. But first, some necessary underpinning:
By political change I mean mainly the great and obvious ones,
e.g. the shift from colony to nation, the collapse of the old
power systems and the rise of new ones at national, regional, and
intercontinental levels. I am concerned primarily with the many
other less obvious or less visible transformations that have come
more slowly in the wake of these changes, the breakdown or re-
arrangement of the many mythologies and assumptions and styles of
behavior that governed the patterns of relationship within the
displaced power systems in the past. The plainest of these are
the superiority-inferiority patterns of races and cultures
2established and maintained during the several centuries of Western
white world dominance. Much that was given in these matters for
so long has now been taken away. Many of our present great con-
fusions arise from this disorderly re-ordering of so much human
experience.
The relative place of virtually every group of people on
earth has shifted in some way as a result of the massive displace-
ments of this time. All the lights, angles, shadows, and
reflections by which we see ourselves or are seen by others have
moved or are moving, all the postures and styles of behavior
ceasing to be what they were and more or less convulsively be-
coming something else. My own attempts to get a closer look at
parts of this kaleidoscopic process have led me from the study of
politics as such to an examination of the ways in which groups of
people perceive others and how these perceptions relate to
fluctuations in power and political interest. This led to efforts
to see how members of particular groups were actually experiencing
the impact of political change on their sense of themselves and
their relationship to others, and this in turn has drawn me into
an exploration of the nature and behavior of what I have been
calling basic group identity.
"Identity" has become a clichd word widely and variously used.
3It means different things to different people but it remains
important because it plainly means something important to every-
body. Like "personality" - or "character" or "soul" or even
"psyche" or "ego" - it is something all God's children have but
which remains elusive, its shape at any moment seeming to depend
on which mirror one is looking into, or in which one is being seen,
and by whom. To begin to try to see how writers of different
kinds have been using the term "identity", and especially to see
where and how they have been using it to link the individual to
the larger social groups and processes of which he is part, a
member of my seminar at M.I.T. has assembled a bibliography of
well over a hundred items culled from the current literature of
half a dozen disciplines, from psychoanalysis through anthropology
and sociology to political science. There is plainly not much
clear order or even agreed definition among these many uses of
identity, but all kinds of suggestive insights hover in and around
some of them, especially at the broader end of the spectrum where
the effort is being most explicitly made to explore the relation
of the individual to the changing society in which he lives.
Much sloshing still goes on in the still-shallow pools of "culture
and personality" and "national character," but students of man,
*
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4society, and contemporary history are meeting each other at more
and more points along this stream of inquiry and are, we hope,
getting on toward faster-running and deeper waters.
What I have been learning myself, meanwhile, is that while
every man's individual identity is unique, it is at the same time
inseparable from the group identity he shares with others, I
once described this by saying that while every man may indeed be
an island, islands rarely stand alone but more usually in groups
and archipelagoes that share many features in common. I have
elsewhere used the metaphor of clustered groups of cells joined
by common membranes. Each person obviously acquires many group
identities as he moves through life, but the reference here is to
what I have been trying to distinguish by calling it basic group
identity, made up of those shared holdings with which every person
is quite involuntarily endowed from birth. Some of these are
derived from his genes, some from his culture's past, some from
its present: his ethnic being, his color and physical characteris-
tics, his group name, its history and its origins, his nationality
and national consciousness, the economy and geography of the land
See "Group Identity and Political Change," International
House Bulletin, Tokyo, April 1964.
5of his birth, the legacies of his culture - language, religion,
inherited value system - his family's social, economic, and
political threshold, and, indeed, all the larger impinging cir-
cumstances of his time.
I have observed further that the essential function of this
basic group identity is to furnish an individual with the sufficient
measure of self-acceptance, self-esteem, and self-pride which his
own individual identity does not always grant him. It is chiefly
in relations with members of other groups that these elements of
basic group identity become the essential determinants of group
self-esteem. These relations occur at many levels and in many
ways and in many conditions, but by far the most important of these
is the political condition, i.e., the status of power in which the
group identity is held. How dominant or how dominated is the group
to which the individual belongs and how, therefore, is he able to
bear himself in relation to others? This, I believe, is the
cardinal question, and if it has been important in times of
relatively stable relationships, it has become all the mwre Lo in
a time like the present when all systems of power are being changed,
all group relationships being revised, all group identities being
forced to rearrange themselves to meet transforming circumstances.
This is the current condition of all sorts and kinds of men an.\d it
is from some of them going through this experience in diffeiraent
6settings that I have been trying to learn something about its nature.
The elements of group identity sort themselves out in many
different weights, shapes, and measures, play different relative
roles for different groups, and, under the pressures of external
change, produce different levels of intensity of problem or crisis
in the lives of individuals. It is probably impossible for these
differences to be scaled or measured without ironing out too many
of the varieties of the experience as it appears from group to
group, from sector to sector within any single group, and from
individual to individual. It is not always possible to draw the
simple straight lines that classification requires or to flash
some kind of automatic signal when one passes from one shaded area
into another. Yet is is needful to distinguish, for example,
between what might be called a group identity problem and a group
identity crisis and to be aware that there are gradations inbe-
tween even if they cannot always be precisely named or located.
The issue may gnaw deeply into the awareness of some members of
a group and not of others. Some may escape this awareness none
of the time, some may do so some of the time, while many find it
possible to ignore it altogether while they go about their daily
concerns. For some it can become an issue which overhangs every
hour of life and which a person must resolve in order to function
7and to meet even the simplest continuing needs of his everyday
existence. In the sense of these differences, I would classify
Filipinos and Japanese as having group identity problems, and
educated ex-Untouchables in India and Negroes in America as going
through group identity crises.
It is also going to be necessary to try to show how the
various elements of group identity order themselves in any given
case, a ranking of importance or saliency which varies greatly
from group to group. Sometimes it is one element, sometimes
another, sometimes two or more in combination, which become the
nuclear center around which all the other elements move and to
which they relate, e.g., as with color and physical characteristics
for American Negroes, nationality or national consciousness for
Chinese in Malaya, or what one might call awareness of nation for
the Japanese, or history and origins for the ex-Untouchables in
India. It is this element of history and origins - to which I have
sometimes referred by the broader term culture past - that I will
attempt here to trace through the patterns of interaction of group
identity and political change as I have observed them in the six
groups I have studied. If I were to attempt to shorthand it by
a choice of verbs to describe what each of these groups wants to
do to its past, I would come up with the following:
9and repressions, or with special forms of neurotic social behavior
by individuals (as in instances of Negroes or Jews "passing" in a
predominantly white and Gentile society just as some educated
ex-Untouchables "pass" in caste Hindu society) that one thinks of
any comparable efforts to erase the past. There are parallels of
a kind to be found historically, perhaps, in groups which have from
time to time revised or recreated the myths of their origins in
order to fit them more satisfactorily to some new set of circum-
stances, usually the passage of a group from some lower to some
higher status, e.g., the passage of barbarian hillamen into the
milieu of more civilized lowlanders, or of former slaves to the
position of freedmen. This kind of social climbing, and the re-
writing of group history to go with it, has occasionally occurred
in India where over lengthy periods some lower castes - though
never Untouchables - have been able to hoist themselves into some
more prestigious standing or association. There are partial parallels
also, perhaps, in some aspects of the more recent passage of many
peoples from colonial subjection to sovereign nationhood. In the
pulling down of the flags, statues, and monuments put up by the
erstwhile conquerors, there is some shadow of this effort to make
non-history of a past of which a group is ashamed. It is not the
same thing, however, as the use of the Orwellian memory chutes by
the modern totalitarians in Russia and China, although there might
10
be some touch of resemblance to it in the need felt by some persons
at certain periods in both these societies to efface backgrounds
- "bourgeois" or "landholding" - which have become liabilities in
the new situation.
None of these possible or partial parallels, recent or remote,.
seems to me, however, to have quite the ingredient of total shame
and total rejection and total desire to efface origins which
characterizes the newly-emergent ex-Untouchable who is seeking some
tolerable way of new life for himself and his children. He views
his past as totally shameful and degrading. He sees nothing in
it that he would preserve or retain or pass on to his own family.
Indeed it is precisely the experience of emancipation through edu-
cation and his rise up the social-economic ladder that has led him
to feel this shame where his fathers and grandfathers knew only
passive acceptance. What he wants now, more than anything else,
therefore, is to be quit of this past altogether, to keep his
children from ever discovering what it was, to have them grow up
without the deformities of mind and spirit which he fears this
knowledge would impose upon them. As I have reported in some de-
tail elsewhere the ex-Untouchable in India is emerging into a
society that is not itself changing rapidly enough to receive him
India' s Ex-Untouchables, John Day Co., New York, 1965.
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on the new basis that is now required. He obviously cannot
achieve the total severance he seeks from the past either for
himself or for his children. As a result he passes into a kind
of semi-limbo in which he is no longer quite subhuman, but also,
by the still-prevailing standards and practices of Indian caste,
not yet quite human either.
Historically, not a few Untouchables sought escape by
embracing other faiths and became some of the earliest members
of the Christian and Moslem communities in India but continued in
many cases to retain some measure of Untouchable status even as
Christians or Moslems, and even over many generations of time.
More recently one large Untouchable group, the Mahars of
Maharashtra, followed their great leader, B.R. Ambedkar, in mass
conversions to Buddhism, but this has proved to be even less of an
escape for them, and they remain a relatively small group of only
two to three million; the greater bulk of India's 65,000,000
ex-Untouchables remain within the Hindu fold. Among educated
Hindu ex-Untouchables, there are many who hope that they can remain
in their place but achieve a more tolerable caste status by
acquiring touchability, thus allowing them to blend into the
greater mass of other caste groups. Others solace themselves with
the hope that all caste groups will disappear so that all can start
afresh under the common mantle of the newly-born Indian nationality
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that belongs to all. It is not possible to suggest that either of
these prospects - achievement of touchability by Untouchable
castes within the cast system, or abolition of caste altogether -
is likely to come to pass at any time soon, not at the present pace
of social change in India. In these circumstances, the individual's
best small hope is to disappear by "passing" into some more ac-
ceptable, i.e. touchable caste, and even in this he is badly
blocked by the powerful persistence of caste as the governing
framework of the society and the difficulty - indeed, the near
impossibility - of concealing one's caste identity when it comes
to the crucial occasions of marriage and death. In their own
particularly poignant way, the ex-Untouchables of India cannot
escape their historynot yet, and not for a long time to come.
Negroes and Africans
American Negroes seek not to erase their past but to redis-
cover it, to find in it those prideful associations- and sources
of self-acceptance so largely lost to them during the long period
of their submergence. This has to do with their past as Americans
and also with that part of their history and origins that lies
more remately in Africa.
There were some Negroes in America who for a long time did
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want to efface the past, or more particularly their own personal
connection to the slave past, and they managed this by having or
claiming to have descent from Negroes who either never had been
slaves or else gained their freedom at some satisfactorily early
stage. This was one form of adaptation common among one narrow
segment of the Negro community and it is the kind of thing which
has been all but swept away by the quickened changes of the last
decade or so. Now the accent is on a strong counter-assertion of
the tradition of the freedom movement among Negroes with a gallery
of martyrs and heroes going back at least as far as the history
of the Republic itself. This tradition has only in the last few
years been brought into the more common view, among both Negroes
and whites, by the growth and spread of a new literature. It has
been introduced into school texts to replace those which hitherto
ignored it or emphasized the opposite themes of lowliness and
subordination and which for generations had served to create and
reinforce the characteristic patterns of Negro self-rejection and
self-debasement. This burden of shame and ambivalence about the
past is being rapidly shed, all the more quickly since the manner
of the most recent sweeping advances by Negroes has taken on such
an heroically triumphant cast. Whatever may be the other dis-
locations to come up across this time of transition, long before
another school generation makes its way up through the grades,
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Negro Americans will no longer lack for sources of prideful asso-
ciation with their American past. Sharply contradicting Carlyle's
fatuous maxim - "Happy are the people whose annals are blank in
history books" - Negro Americans will not be more content until
their pages of this history are filled and have become part of the
common knowledge of the nation.
The problem of blank pages remains more acute in the matter
of their remoter past in Africa, which has also begun to come into
new focus in this time. The recent African emergence and the
establishment of independent black states in Africa have done a
lot to modify the notions held by many Negro Americans both about
themselves and about their African origins. But in this relation-
ship there are profound complexities, depths of feeling and ex-
perience that have only begun to be stirred and are going to take
a much longer time to be plumbed. I have attempted elsewhere to
report in some detail on what I have found to be some of the
essences of this matter. Imbedded in the Negro American's view
of Africa over the generations has been the core of his deepest
sense of himself. This has had to do, centrally and crucially,
with his physical being, his color and physical characteristics,
his blackness and his Negroidness, and the values placed on these
The New World of Negro Americans, John Day, New York 1963.
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characteristics by the over-ridingly dominant white world and
internalized at great depth for a long period of time by Negroes
themselves. Here, I believe, lies the crux of the Negro group
identity crisis, and in it the Negro's physical being and his his-
tory are closely embraced. The white world has pictured Africa
as the "continent without a history* and of black men as standing
somehow apart, left behind in a primeval past, untouching and
untouched by the mainstreams of development of human civilization.
This has been the notion of nothingness or non-being or invisibility
that has dominated the white man's view of the black man and became
the black man's view of himself during the centuries of white
domination.
Negro resistance to this image of their remoter origins began
to assert itself in America long, long ago, and the record of it
will be found in a slender but continuous succession of works that
stretch from those of Martin R. Delany and others before the Civil
War through those of Alexander Crummell followed by W.3.B. Duois,
beginning at the turn of this century, and in the output of the
Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, founded in
1915, and especially of its director, Carter Woodson, and others
after him and since. This is a literature of many different kinds
and levels but much of it represents a brave and dogged determination,
maintained by many stout and remarkable individuals in the face of
the universal rejection and contradiction of the self-assuredly
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dominant white world, to rediscover a heritage in which black men
could take pride.
Africans have joined in this effort only much more recently.
African movements of self-reassertion began much later than those
in America but came to their climaxes much more swiftly. Given
the international political circumstances of the 1950s, the de-
parture of colonial power from Africa was quick, almost precipitate,
and Africans were vaulted into independent nationhood with great and
sudden speed. A black poet, not an African but a French West
Indian, had produced the concept of negritude, seeking in some
mystical element in a common blackness the source of a new African
self-esteem. This was now joined by the less poetic British
African notion of an "African personality" to perform the same
needed function. In the face of inevitable national and tribal
conflicts and collisions, these mystical or semi-mystical notions
of a racial or continental community among Africans are not likely
to go far very soon in serving the needs of a common self-esteem.
Meanwhile the names chosen by some of the new states, Ghana, Mali,
and more recently, Malawi, suggest the presence of the impulse to
regain contact with the more distant African past and in some of
these countries fresh efforts have begun under various auspices to
rediscover a history long lost or unknown.
This is going to involve the creation of new myths as well as
the recreation of old onesnew versions of facts, new
17
interpretations - all the essential business carried on by the
historians from generation to generation - and we may be in for
some lively exchanges of ethnocentric motes and beams as the
shutters are opened more widely on the fields of history and more
eyes see in more different ways what is there. Winston Churchill
has said something to the effect that history is a people's memory
and - if only from his own example as historian - we know how
self-serving memory can be and indeed usually is. Scholarship in
history performs the role of refining the myths by the constant
searching out, ordering and re-ordering of the "facts" and its
resemblance to reality increases mainly as its versions and
interpretations multiply. It in hardly possible to doubt that these
refinements will appear soon enough as the effort continues, with
increasing rigor and discipline, to revise the common state of
awareness, among black men and white, of the black men's place in
the human story. In this greater and deeper redressment and re-
assessment of the remoter past, Negro Americans and emergent
Africans share a common need and have a great conmon stake.
American Jews and Israel
Unlike people who carry the burden of having a history of
which they are ashamed or of seeming to have no history at all,
Jews are people who had almost nothing but their history to serve
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them for centuries as a major source of self-esteem. Their
religion, based on a body of laws and on a tradition that consists
mainly of the history of their origins as a people, served as the
main carrier of this sustenance over an extended period of time.
During this time, Jews lost most of the other normally-shared
features of a single people, including even such common physical
characteristics as they might ever have had. Even their religion,
as far as its specific formal practice was concerned, eventually
split into several segments and took on, like the physical ap-
pearance of Jews, a great number of different local colors and
variations. Being a Jew" meant, as far as any universal or common
definition could go, being a person linked to a certain history
involving an ancient Law, the idea of a single God, and the con-
viction of being chosen to do that God' s business on earth. This
was a history of origins, moreover, meshed into the origins of what
is called Western, or "Judeo-Christian" civilization as a whole.
At various times and places through the centuries of the Diaspora,
many Jews "disappeared,." as individuals and sometimes in whole
groups, and many more suffered all the varieties of self-hatred and
self-rejection that afflicts despised and subordinated groups.
But this essential view of the Jewish identity framed by the tradition
of Jewish history was apparently enough to sustain the greater
number of Jews for a remarkably long time in their unique apartness
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and to arm them against the rejection, hostility, and persecution
that reached its culmination in the Hitlerian holocaust.
The re-establishment of Israel as a Jewish state after an
interval of some 2,000 years was an attempt by Jews not only to
find ground on which to defend themselves against extermination
but also to fix a political framework once more for the Jewish
separateness, to establish a national sum for their many parts.
It presents in some ways perhaps the most dramatic of all our
current examples of the impact of political change on group identity,
for in Israel today, where Jews have gathered from some seventy
odd countries all around the world, the question of questions is:
who and what is a Jew?
This question is wrapped up into a great swirl of cloudy
confusion, unhelped by any light at night, and involves in some
way for every Jew every aspect of the group identity complex, name,
color, physical characteristics, nationality, history and origins,
and the mix of culture-past and culture-present out of which the
new Israeli identity is to be formed. Of these no one is more
centrally fixed or more emotionally charged than the matter of
history and origins.
It is a strongly-held view of Israel's Zionist elite - developed
by its elders when the return was still only a remote dream and
now strongly embraced by Israeli-born youth - that the last prideful
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chapter of Jewish history ended when the last Israeli resistance
to the invaders collapsed in Jerusalem in 70 A.D. and that the
Diaspora that followed was a long dark age in which the Jew
became a creature of weakness and shame. In this view, proper
Jewish history was resumed only in 1948 when the State of Israel
was recreated by fighting Jews and all Jews could become Israelis
again. This strongly positive view of the glories of the remote
Jewish past has as its underside a strongly negative view of
Diaspora Jewry, and above all of East European Jewry from which
this Zionist elite itself stems and from which its younger Israel-
born members are barely a generation removed.
In the flow of these attitudes and feelings about the past,
different pools of meaning have begun to form around the terms
"Jew" and "Israeli. One comes upon them readily enough in Israel
now, among both the old and the young of this tradition, but
especially among the young. To be an "Israeli" means not to be
the "Jew" whom the Gentile world held in contempt for so long, and
this is essentially the "Jew" represented by the whole stock of
anti-Semitic stereotypes built up around the Diaspora Jew, or more
specifically around the East European Jew. Being in Zion means
to be no longer a pale and puny and money-trading "Jew", but a tan
and muscular and strong soil-tilling "Israeli," no longer cringing
and defenseless, no longer a homeless Yiddish-speaking wanderer
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unwanted everywhere, but a Hebrew-speaking citizen of one's own
ancient land, reclaimed by force of one's own arms and prowess and
stoutly held by the same means. These attitudes get rather sticky
when taken by brash young Israelis in relation to the great
majority of Hitler's victims - some of their elders choose less
extreme language at this point. But this remains an integral part
of the new Israeli self-image gained by cutting across 2,000 years
of Jewish history and picking up the threads of that more glorious
past broken long long ago. It re-establishes the primary place
of the national-historic tradition in the Jewish identity, displacing
the religion to which Zionists most commonly give small place or
no place at all, either as socialists who reject religion in
general, or as Zionists who reject post-Biblical Judaism as part
of the unwanted baggage of the Diaspora. It is the essence of the
view so often bluntly stated by David Ben Gurion, longtime premier
of Israel, that the Jew who does not return to Zion ceases to be
a Jew in the true, i.e., the Zionist sense of the word. He dooms
himself to remain a "Jew" in the shameful Diaspora sense, or to
disappear into the Gentile majority, the fate usually predicted
by Israeli Zionists for the great mass of the 5,000,000 Jews who
are Americans.
As might be readily imagined, not many American Jews subscribe
enthusiastically to the Ben Gurion-Zionist view either of the
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Jewish past or of the American Jewish future. American Zionism
and American Jews generally gave decisive backing to the early
settlement of Palestine and to the struggle for the creation of the
state and they continue to give it much-needed support now. The
problem of the future relationship between American Jewry and
Israel has been and continues to be heavily debated, but I think
it is accurate to say that for the great mass of American Jews
the main issues - at least as they are stated by Ben Gurion - are
hwdly even debatable. They do ngt have any intention or
expectation of migrating to Israel to become Israelis. They do
not expect to have to cower under any future anti-Semitic perse-
cutions in the United States. They do n expect to disappear into
a homogenized American society. Certain rather strongly contrary
propositions appear in the argument: (1) that as American society
becomes more and more effectively a plural society, the integration
of American Jews is reaching the point where the great majority of
them see no contradiction or even any hyphenation between being
Jews and Americans; (2) that instead of being wholly assimilated -
as some are and will be - into American Gentile society via inter-
marriage and abandonment of their religion, the great bulk of
American Jews are assimilating American history as part of their own
history and are shaping themselves into a distinctive group enjoying
whatever it is that unites them as Jews while sharing with all
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others their common holdings as Americanst (3) that the element
that will be decisive in maintaining a couunity of Jews within the
American society will be the maintenance of the beliefs and
practices of the Jewish religion in whatever changing forms it
acquires in the American environment; and finally (4) that while
this process is a long way from resolution, whether in Israel or
America, the logic of it clearly suggests that in the two places
Jews will arrive at quite different rearrangements of the assorted
elements of history, nationality, and religion, in coming to new
decisions about who and what they are.
Of the 5,000,000 American Jews, a tiny handful of 10,000 or
so have joined the 2,000,000 other Jews from other countries who
are becoming Israelis in Israel. This small group of imigrants
forms a special enclave of its own in this many-sided rearrangement
of Jewish locations and identifications. In their experience of
trying to become Israelis, this set of issues gets most sharply
and dramatically drawn. It was among members of this group that
I conducted my own small inquiry in Israel and I shall be reporting
elsewhere at length on the ways in which they reflect and illustrate
the uniqueness of having a history not only as Jews but also as
Americans. Being Jews and Americans turns out to be quite dif-
ferent, especially in Israel, from being Jews and anything else.
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Post-colonial Filipinos
The group identity patterns that appear most visibly on the
open surfaces of Filipino life are those having to do with the
various regional identities - Tagalog, Visayan, Pampangeno, Ilocano,
etc. - which are still most meaningful to most Filipinos. There
are other deeper and stronger feelings less directly expressed among
Filipinos about their various ethnic mixes, about having Spanish
or Chinese antecedents, about being darker or lighter-skinned, or
having this or that kind of eyes or nose. In suggesting, however,
that Filipinos feel a need to resolve their past, I am referring
to the layering of Filipino history, of its Malay, Spanish, and
American parts, among which some Filipinos have begun to search
for an identity that they can feel is distinctively their own.
Their problem arises out of the troubling fear that some of these
searchers - writers, scholars, a few politicians, and some of the
new radical youth - seem to feel, that they are a people who have
always taken on and worn the features of others, that nothing
authentically Filipino is there.
Out of this has come an impulse to look with new eyes at
the remote "Malay" past. The peoples of the Philippines come
from the same "Malay" or other aboriginal stock that
peopled most of Southeast Asia in the prehistoric past. In the
Philippines this ancient stock and its culture has been
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best preserved among the mountain tribes. Until just recently
these hillsmen were looked upon by the Christian Filipino low-
landers as pagan, primitive, and savage. Now the hill people are
beginning to be seen by some as older, purer brothers, untainted
by Spanish or Chinese infusions, or by any of the multiple
borrowings of foreign ways and creeds.* There is now a government
Commission on Integration whose job it is to restore the mountain
peoples to their rights and dignities as citizens of the republic
though no one is sure whether the aim should be to assimilate or to
pluralize. There is a certain cult of romantic glorification of
the tribal arts, dance troupes dance their cances, scholars collect
their artifacts, artists carve and paint their rough-hewn lines
and bright colors. This new view of the remoter past has made
its way also into the realm of high policy, the "couon Malay
stock" becoming a major theme in the rhetoric surrounding the
abortive "Naphilindo" pact which linked the Philippines, Indonesia,
and Malaya for a few weeks in the summer of 1963.
The resurrection of the "Malay" past evidently can become a
mixed matter as far as the search for new sources of self-esteem
is concerned. It seems peculiarly relevant in this context to
remark that the Malay peoples of southeastern Asia took - or were
taken - more completely than any other by invading alien religions,
Islam in Malaya and Indonesia, and Roman Catholicism in the
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Philippines. The new arrivals found some Hindu underpinnings, also
brought long before from the outside, which had been superimposed
on animism of the primitive indigenous cultures. Some of these
survived more or less intact as in Hindu Bali, but both Hindu and
animist backgrounds showed through mainly in the way the new
dominant beliefs came to be held and practiced. Whatever may be
the meaning of this greater permeability, it would seem at least
that all the "Malay" peoples have to dig a lot harder to uncover
their own distinctive past greatnesses than, say, the Indians or
the Chinese. Indeed, some Filipinos with whom I discussed this
matter of their remoter ancestors seemed not only not to draw pride
from the association but appeared to blame them for the meekness
and weakness with which they received, accepted, and buckled under
to foreign conquering force, whether of arms or of creed or both.
The Philippines, in any case, were much more thickly-layered-
over than the other colonized areas of Southeast Asia. The British
and Dutch colonial systems left bad enough alone, much more alone,
and thus allowed much more of the previously-existing cultural
sytems and practices to survive. During their 300 years' rule, the
Spanish reshaped much more of what they found and this was done
primarily through the Catholic Church. The Church became the
principal instrument of Spanish power and placed its heavy imprint
on the whole culture in a great host of visible and invisible ways.
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Revolution, when it finally came in the 1890s, was anti-clerical
and anti-Church, and although the revolutionists voted for
separation of Church and State (by a single vote), the Church
survived the abuses of its friars and hierarchy, the revolution,
and even the replacement of Spanish power by American. Neither
an independent national church started by the anti-Spanish
revolutionists, nor the Protestant creeds introduced by the
Americans seriously dented the hold of the Church on the population
which has remained more than 80 percent Catholic. This history,
in any case, made and left the Philippines "the only Christian
nation in Asia" - something of which the older generation was
generally proudy it raised them above all the other heathen
peoples of Asia. But now it makes some of the younger generation
wince, because it is what makes them, they feel, "un-Asian" and
keeps them separated from their true blood brothers.
Besides the pervasiveness of the religion, the Spanish
impress was laid hard on every other aspect of the country's life,
starting with its very name, which honors a Spanish monarch, and
the name Filipino that the people now go by and the individual
names many of them bear. (Filipino in the Spanish time referred
only to Spaniards born in the Philippines; the local population,
as in all of Latin America, were called Indios, a term of lowliness
and contempt. After the defeat of Spain, the name Filipino was
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appropriated by the Indios and made official by the new American
rulers. The Spanish family names borne by so many Filipinos were
acquired only in the smallest part by actual descenty the great
bulk were given these names by official fiat in 1845.) The Spanish
mode was pressed on the country's customs and folkways, its dancing,
dress, and indirectly but powerfully, on its languages. Although
only a tiny proportion of the people ever spoke Spanish, its accent
and vocabulary were absorbed by the major Filipino tongues to such
an extent that many Filipinos who never spoke any Spanish neverthe-
less speak English with what sounds very much like a Spanish or
Latin American accent. It goes along with the strong Latin American
aura that overhangs even some of the most Americanized precincts
of Filipino life. People attribute many of their "ways" to the
Spanish influence, the authoritarian family system, manana habits,
florid styles of temperament, speech, and dress, and notions of
"pride" and "honor." Perhaps most important of all, it was from
the Spaniards that the Filipinos acquired their own aristocratic
upper class, the land-owning mestizos, who in contrast to the
Eurasians everywhere else in colonial Asia, became, in accordance
with the Spanish practice established in Latin America, part of the
ruling class. They remain, next to the "pure blood" Spaniards
still in evidence, the most prestigious segment of the uppercclass
in the Philippines to this day. If middle and upper class Filipinos
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are proud of anything at all, they are proudest of those features
of their own life and society which they acquired, or can claim
to have acquired, from Spain.
From their American period, which lasted about 50 years,
Filipinos are most likely to say that they acquired their system
of universal education - which gave them the highest literacy
rate of any colony in Asia and the highest proportion of educated
women - a new set of political ideas and a set of political
institutions built on American models. From these, with all their
remarkable imperfections, they somehow acquired the strong sense
of a stake of their own in their society which made them the only
people in Southeast Asia to resist the Japanese invasion. From
these also comes the underpinning of the high degree of
political stability and government-by-electoral-consensus which
the Philippines have enjoyed all but uniquely among the newly-
independent nations. They also acquired a more of less mangled
English as a lingua franca spoken by an estimated 40 percent of
the population, and a substantial slice of the urban population
has acquired a more or less thin veneer of the supermarket-billboard-
radio-TV-cars-cocacola-soap-sex-deodorant syndrome that passes in
so many places for the typical externals of the good American life.
These different threads are woven together to make some of the
more notable designs one can find in Filipino life now. The
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formal nationalist tradition, the heroes, martyrs, holidays, ob-
servances, are all associated with the strongly anti-clerical
1896 revolution against Spain, while among its informal values,
the society rates most highly its legacies from Spain, including
its Roman Catholicism. There is no formal nationalist tradition
at all attached to the period of American rule, while currently
at the more informal levels of attitude and feeling, especially
among younger intellectuals, there is strong hostility and
rejection coupled with great ambivalence in relation to the
American influence. It is difficult to resist the analogy which
would suggest that the authoritarian grandfather has fared much
better than the permissive father. Among those seeking to
reassert the distinctive Filipino identity, no one is suggesting
that the Catholic Church close its doors and when it comes to ex-
pressing national feeling by changing names, Dewey Boulevard
becomes Roxas Boulevard. The painful difficulty is that it is
the Yank inside these young Filipinos who can't go home no matter
how much they rail at him to do so. I heard one mature professor
bemoan the fact that the American colonizers undertook to es-
tablish a system of mass educations had they ignored it, as the
Dutch did in Indonesia, Filipinos now - he thought - would be
having a simpler time establishing patterns of their own.
Every so often, amid much handwringing talk about the lack of
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any clear definition of "Filipino-ness," some one tries again
to suggest that all cultures are mixtures of many near and far
influences, absorbed and changed by the genius of the mixers,
that neither the Spanish nor the American layers are the same
things in the Philippines that they were in Spain or America.
This is true, even obvious, but does not satisfy the seekers.
They still want to discover what that unique "genius" of their
own might be. Many Filipinos already gracefully wear their
coat of many colors, but many will not wear it more proudly
until they have re-woven the many threads of their history into
some new design which they will be readier than they are now
to recognize as their very own.
The Post-Imperial Japanese
The myths of Japanese history play a large and obvious part
in Japanese self-esteem. This is formal and most explicit among
members of the older generation, but even the most radical among
the young Japanese are likely to say they are "proud" of Japan's
"tradition," or at least to identify this tradition as an es-
sential ingredient of Japanese-ness.
This "tradition," to be sure, is variously seen. As a
fellow-inquirer acutely remarked, those aspects of the Japanese
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past that are valued and admired by young people in Japan now are
called "Japanese" and "traditional," while those that are disliked
and rejected become "feudalistic" and are not described as being
distinctively "Japanese" at all. In the same way, what they like
or embrace in the present-day culture, they call "modern," while
anything about it they do not like becomes "Westernized," or
"Americanized" or just plain "capitalistic." In general, however,
it seems safe to say that most Japanese in one way or another
enjoy whatever sensations there are to be gained from feeling that
they are of a people with a long recorded history, and can have a
sense of greatness conveyed by their historic myths, of beauty
transmitted by their ancient arts, and even of romantic swagger
borne by their folklore and transmitted, more currently, by their
samurai films. The pride and pleasure they extract from this
past is modified at various points, and one of the most important
of these seems to be a strong sense of the special parenthood, or
at least mentorhood, of China, a relationship that goes back a
dozen or more centuries. This is what gave an almost patricidal
quality to the emotions felt by some over the assaults on China
that Japan began to make seventy years ago, and this is what supplies
that special feeling of guilt that some Japanese feel uniquely
Deborah S. Isaacs, "A Research Report on Some Young People
in Changing Japan," Unpub. ms., December, 1963.
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about China and about none of the other victims of Japan's
abortive attempt to make itself master of all Asia.
While Japan's remoter history seems to remain a more of less
stable element in Japanese self-awareness and self-esteem, it is
this more recent history - of the last hundred years or so - that
figures more dynamically in the group identity problem that now
presses in upon so many Japanese, especially those of the present
youth generation. The heart of this problem is their need to
redefine the identity of the Japanese nation, for it is through
the concept of the nation that everything in the Japanese culture-
past and culture-present comes into focus. The Meiji transformation
that began in 1868 created a nation that generated new kinds of
power, put ancient myths to work to serve new ends, and which set
out under the leadership of its armed forces to challenge Western
power in Asia. Within scarcely half a century, it came astoundingly
close to achieving its military objectives. But it failed to achieve
and lead a real mobilization of Asian nationalism,and its military
power alone, based on a fatally-narrow resource base, was not and
never could have been a match for that of the United States, and
Japan went down. As it was, Japan's attempted conquest did trigger
political revolutions long overdue in most of Asia, but they did
not come to a head until Japan itself was crushed. All things
considered, it was by all odds one of the most extraordinary
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near-misses in the history of power struggles.
What was crushed by the Defeat of 1945 was the nation
created by the Meiji reforms, a semi-mystical system of total
authority rising through all of the hierarchies of the society
to the Emperor at the summit. Japan was transformed by the swift
and deliberate embrace of modern technology into an instrument
of power, and by the shrewd use of the old myths and new drives,
into a system for total mobilization of the minds and energies
of the people. This is the structure that was shattered in
1945, and since then Japanese have had to deal with the problem
of reassembling themselves as a group. This focusses on the
nation, the prewar generation trying to salvage the one they knew,
the wartime generation plunged into a kind of apathetic despair
by the overwhelming sense of having been betrayed by what they had
believingly accepted, and the postwar youth generation vainly
seeking larger coherences to replace the nation as the object of
their allegiances. The process of change in Japan, going on
alongside and within the remarkable economic reconstruction and
transformation of the postwar decades, has been centered on this
business of the nation, getting away from it, getting back to it,
changing it, in some way recreating it, in any case trying to fill
with something new, or at least something different, the empty space
created at the center of Japanese life by the Defeat. The reach
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out to supra-national substitutes has turned out, especially for
the postwar youth generation, a grasp at painfully empty air.
They have found their re-identification neither in international
pacifism nor in internationalism communism, the former being
cynically used by the latter, and the latter itself breaking
spectacularly into its separate national parts, forcing even the
most radical Japanese back on a new Japanism, a new "national
communism" of their own.
This process of rediscovery and reshaping of the Japanese
nation is going on at many different levels and appears in
Japanese life now in many forms, from the resumed open re-avowal
of the existence of Japanese "national interests" and the gradual
restoration of flag and anthem as national symbols to the
re-flocking of millions to the Shinto shrines on the traditional
occasions. In new, and perhaps thinned-out ways, the gloss of
Japan's ancient history is being made to shine again. But even
more meaningfully, the task of reinterpreting its more recent
history has begun. Some conservative writers have embarked on a
bold effort to re-establish a more self-justifying view of Japan's
wars of conquest in Asia and the Pacific during the first half of
this century. Far from being a history of purelj militarist
aggression for which all Japanese should feel ashamed, runs the
argument, it was in truth a war of liberation in Asia and must be
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seen - through the dust and rubble of the defeat - as one of the
great crowning achievements of the Japanese genius. In the dis-
cussion this opened, perhaps more clearly than in any aspect of
the lively scene in Japan today, one can begin to see the fallen
Japanese reintegrating their past - recent and remote - with their
present and beginning, in this way, to put their national parts
together again.
The Chinese Malaysians
Chinese in Malaysia, like Chinese everywhere, are possessors
of a Great Past, indeed, in what is often a not-very humble
opinion common among them, the Greatest of all Pasts. As far as
their view of themselves is concerned, this alone not only places
them at the opposite end of the spectrum from India's ex-Untouchables
but also in a class by themselves and distinctly above all other
peoples on earth, certainly far, far above the Japanese whose
tradition is junior by far to theirs and heavily derived from
Chinese sources in. almost all its important beginnings. This
view was not only self-sustainingly held by Chinese themselves
through their long periods of humiliation by foreign power, but
has also been shared by a great many Westerners in some degree
from the time of Marco Polo down to the present. As I have
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shown elsewhere it has been unadmiringly seen by some as
insupportable Chinese arrogance and self-love, or admiringly by
others as a valid and enviable legacy from the long Chinese past.
In individual Chinese, there are many highly varied forms of this
self-awareness, and these are especially mixed now that the
Communist regime has successfully re-asserted Chinese power and
aroused respect and fear in the rest of the world.
The Chinese Communists and Mao Tse-tung himself are eclectic
to a degree in how they link themselves to the Chinese past, but
the link is explicitly made and vigorously exploited. How
Chinese in China in their several generations are assimilating
these changes, we actually do not know. Chinese abroad, no matter
how far removed or opposed they may be to the new regime, are
drawn or pleased or in some way stirred by the impact of revived
Chinese power and importance. However they may view the Com-
munist manipulation of cherished essentials of the Chinese heritage,
they clearly share in the pleasurable sensations provided by the
re-establishment of what was, from ancient times, Chung Kuo, or the
Central Country, or in truth, the center of world. In any case,
whether in response to the present power revival, or in continuing
Scratches on Our Minds, American Images of China and India,
John Day Cos., New York, 1958.
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attachment of some kind to the remoter cultural past, whether out
of highly-educated knowledge of this tradition, or out of a partly-
educated or even uneducated awareness of its existence, it is
plainly here that Chinese self-esteem is most deeply-rooted. This
seems to be true among Chinese of all kinds and classes, and
especially so among Chinese overseas, even among many who are of
the third and fourth generation out of China.
The major political changes that have come to China and
Southeast Asia in the past two decades have given peculiarly
greater importance to the emotional and political alignments of
the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, and nowhere more so than
in Malaysia where some 4,000,000 Chinese are grappling with the
brand new problem of acquiring the brand new political identity of
Malaan or Malaysian. In Malaysia the Chinese are not the relatively
small minority they are elsewhere in the region but comprise nearly
half the total population, and the most dynamic and energetic half
at that. The other larger half are the Malays whose top leaders
- sultans, princes, and related aristocrats - are politically
dominant in the country, but whose mass is still largely illiterate,
economically and socially backward, and apathetic. The shape of
- there is also a small Indian minority -
the new relations between these two groups(will determine the shape,
indeed the fate, of Malaysia. These relations will determine the
further internal evolution of Malaysian society and will bear with
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great and even ominous weight on the way Malaysia will respond to
the large new surrounding pressures, the expansionist pressure of
neighboring Indonesia, with its great size and its appeal to Malay
"unity," and from the other direction, the tangible and intangible
aura of the new Chinese power stretching its influence over
everyone 's view of the future. The pattern of tenuous alliance
and latent conflict which links Indonesia and Communist China also
appears in Malaysian politics, where a fragile coalition links
Malay and Chinese leaderships, the one bedevilled by a pro-
Indonesian Malay opposition and the other by pro-Communist Chinese.
These two in turn cautiously and tentatively relate to each other
across the same barriers of mutual mistrust and rejection that
lie between Malays and Chinese in general.
This apartness is based on a whole spectrum of things, recent
and remote. It only begins with the staple explanation that in
Malaya the merchants and traders are the "alien" Chinese and the
poor farmers and fishermen are the "native " Malays. The truth of
the matter cuts far deeper and is rooted in profound differences
of cultural past, history, style of life. These differences are
so great that contrary to their common practice elsewhere, Chinese
have intermarried rather sparsely with Malays. The demanding
rigidities of Islam have had much to do with this, but even the
"babas " - the descendants of earlier Chinese immigrants who began
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coming several centuries back, and who adopted Malay language,
dress, food, and even sometimes took Malay mates - have generally
remained unmistakably and identifiably Chinese. The greater mass
of more recent immigrants, who began to come as laborers in the
last century,remained much more apart, keeping to their own com-
munities, establishing their own schools, educating their own
children, keeping their own language, customs, and separate identity.
They saw themselves as more or less temporary exiles from China,
kept close ties to their kin there, sent money back, and planning
to return themselves, if only to die or be buried there. Inevitably
as time passed and many prospered, the British-controlled Malay
states became "home" but never in the same sense that China remained
their homeland. A small number in the Straits Settlements
- directly-administered British colonies - followed the older
immigrants in becoming British subjects or "protected persons."
The great majority, however, remained politically as well as
culturally tied to China. There was no such thing as a "Malayan"
nationality and insofar as there was ever any question about it,
the Chinese in Malaya mostly remained Chinese citizens. They
helped finance the Chinese revolutions of 1911 and 1925-27, and
supported the resistance to Japan when it invaded China in 1937.
When the Japanese invaded Malaya itself in 1942, it was Chinese
who organized armed resistance while most Malays more or less
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passively welcomed the new conquerors. This had its aftermath in
bloody clashes between Chinese and Malays when the war ended, and
in a Chinese Communist guerrilla insurrection and terror campaign
that continued into the mid-1950s. By negotiation and settlement
with the British, the Malay political leaders and princes finally
joined their sultanates into the new Federation of Malaya and
became an independent nation in 1957. The chief internal social
problem of the new state was the redefinition of the place of the
Chinese in the new system and their relationship to the Malays.
The Malays regarded themselves as the only true "sons of
the soil" and the Chinese essentially as "aliens," and built certain
preferential advantages for themselves into the new constitution and
new political system. These included restrictions on Chinese
citizenship, land ownership, and ownership in certain specified
enterprises, quotas (at four to one) on key places in the civil
service and on scholarships for higher education. They saw to it
that by careful weighting, the rural Malay districts would
permanently dominate the Chinese urban areas in the new parliament.
They declared Malay to be the national language and moved to
eliminate or control the Chinese schools, and proceeded to spend
large sums of government money to build elaborate mosques which were
obviously for themselves alone. In sum, the new regime offered its
Chinese citizens and inhabitants a species of second class
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citizenship and indicated its readiness to accept participation
of those Chinese who accepted this subordinate place in the new
scheme of things. The Chinese leadership - essentially its
conservative segment representing the sizeable economic stake of
the Chinese in the society - cooperated in setting up this new
system in an effort to find some new basis for future accommo-
dations and a new status for Chinese Malayans. But as might be
expected, this brought on many new tensions and conflicts,
particularly over the issue of language and control of schools,
but also over broader political orientations. These issues were
not relieved but simply extended when the enlarged Federation of
Malaysia was created in 1963, bringing in Singapore - an almost
all-Chinese metropolis - and the Borneo territories of Sarawak and
Sabah. They remain the core issues in the further development of
the new nation.
Obviously there are many ways in which both Malays and Chinese
differ not only from each other but among themselves. The Chinese,
for their part, vary in the degree of their Chinese-ness and
differ sharply in their political and emotional alignments. One
of the most important sets of these differences appears between
the Chinese-educated and the English-educated Chinese. The Chinese
educated - and this takes in the great majority right up to the
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most recent school generations - are products of the privately-
supported Chinese school system which focussed wholly in language
and curriculum on the Chinese background. This included exposure
to Chinese history and literature and, in the last few generations,
the successful spread of the use of kuo-yu, the national Chinese
language, or "Mandarin," as the common laguage of educated over-
seas Chinese. It also has inevitably included exposure to the
major currents of political influence from the homeland, of the
Kuomintang from Sun Yat-sen's days up to 1949, and more recently,
the competing influences of Peking and Taiwan. This competition,
incidentally, encouraged the older and more cautious operators of
these schools to lapse into an official neutralism about homeland
politics and this had the effect of deepening still further the
commitment to the underlying Chinese tradition common to all. In
any case, for the great majority of young Chinese until quite
recently, this educational experience had the effect of centering
their sense of themselves on China, on their Chinese origins, on
Chinese classical and historic tradition, and, inevitably, on their
present and continuing link to their Chinese homeland. In the
present situation, this has led to political orientations which on
the conservative side becomes accommodation and cautious waiting;
and on the radical side to political activity aimed at creating a
Malaysia that will eventually be associated in some satisfactory
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alignment with China.
The English-educated - estimated at anywhere from 10 to 25 %
according to how you count them - are generally those who moved at
a very early age into the English-language stream, usually through
mission schools and government-supported schools designed to supply
the ruling regime with a supply of English-speaking employees and
junior civil servants. Many retained the Hakka, Hokkien, or
Cantonese dialects learned at home as children, but many lost even
this limited speaking acquaintance with the ancestral tongue and
remained wholly illiterate in Chinese as they went on to become
English-speaking, English-reading, and English-writing. They
completely "lost" the China their brothers were gaining in the
Chinese schools and gained instead the history of the British
Empire - England Ober alles - and fragments of the world of Drake
Elizabeth, Shakespeare, Raffles, Nelson, Wordsworth and Tennyson.
They acquired not merely a language but a body of knowledge or
information, a way of life, an outlook, and a political orientation
that carried them at a sharp tangent away from their Chinese-educated
brothers. This is a difference made up of many things, many of
them bitter, ironic, or paradoxical, but the hard essence of the
matter is that to the Chinese-educated China remained the most
important place in the world ; to the English-educated it did not.
45
The English-educateds did not lose their Chinese-ness, but it no
longer included the total commitment to their Chinese background,
history, and origins which their Chinese-educated brothers acquired
and fight to retain. Hence these are the Chinese who more than any
other seriously seek a way of integrating as Malayans. Malaya has
more truly become their homeland and they want - some of them
desperately - to become fully qualified participants in its affairs.
In this aim they are deeply and painfully frustrated, in the
first place by the barriers that the Malays put in their way, but
even more, one suspects, by the blocks they discover within them-
selves, No matter how much less "Chinese" they may be than their
Chinese-educated brothers, they remain very much Chinese vis-ai-vis
the Malays. They can perhaps feel that British - or Western -
culture is worthy of respect and capable of commanding a major
degree of assimilation on their part, even as Chinese. But they
are quite unable to see Malay culture, or a Malay-dominated culture
in anything like the same light. They can sometimes see a faint
hope of joining with their English-educated Malay and Indian
counterparts to build a new society based on the language and
values absorbed from their English education, but this hope re-
mains a feeble one given their present numbers and circumstances.
On the other hand, they cannot see themselves assimilating at all
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to the currently dominant Islamic and conservative Malay society
which, despite its own great fragility and peril, continues to
offer them nothing more than an unacceptable second-classness.
Indeed, as they see themselves through these prisms, Chinese and
Malays find it all but impossible now to see each other on any
common ground.
